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Abstract 
In recent years there has been an intensification 
of demands for independence on the part of many sub- 
national regions in Western and other countries. The 
literature concerning these movements has tended to 
neglect systematic investigation of the economic 
aspects of separatism in favor of noneconomic issues. 
This paper focuses on the actual and potential eco- 
nomic advantages and disadvantages implicit in separa- 
tion. Numerous specific cases are used to illustrate 
the general arguments. The conclusions, though strongly 
qualified, tend to support the position that it is not 
unreasonable to expect an increase in regional economic 
well-being if separation occurs in many of the cases 
examined. While the central issue is not likely to 
be decided on purely economic grounds, clarification . 
of the economic issues should at least enhance the 
rationality of the decision-making process. 
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Economic Aspects of Regional Separatism 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been an intensification of 
demands for political independence on .the part of many 
subnational regions in Western countries. These movements 
have been inspired in varying degree by often-interrelated 
political, social, ethnic and economic considerations. However, 
the relevant journalistic and scholarly literature has tended 
to neglect systematic investigation of the economic dimensions 
of separatism in favor of discussions of the noneconomic a'spects. 
In contrast, this paper focuses on the actual and ~otential 
economic advantages and disadvantages implicit in political 
separation. While the central question is not likely to be 
decided on purely economic grounds, clarification of the eco- 
nomic issues should at least enhance the rationality of the 
decision-making process. 
REGIONAL-NATIONAL DISAGPSEMENT: EXIT VERSUS LOYALTY 
There is no necessary reason why a subnational region 
should look to its own national government for its ultimate 
self-interest. The reason why most regions do so at present 
is because of the economic and political power vested in the 
nation-state. However, separation becomes a viable issue when 
an articulate and influential regional leadership group gives 
focus to wide-spread feeling that the nation-state is not respon- 
sive to the region's needs. When this happens, three basic 
alternatives may be considered. One is political separation 
and the formation of an independent nation, as has k e n  proposed 
for ~ugbec. Another is political separation followed by merger 
into a larger international federation of regions, as has been 
proposed for subnational regions of Western Europe. In this 
view, the basis for a new Europe must be the region because the 
t r a d i t i o n a l  n a t i o n - s t a t e ,  which i s  l o s i n g  ( o r  s h o u l d  l o s e )  
power t o  Europe on  to^ and t o  t h e  r e g i o n s  below, i s  t o o  d i s t a n t  
from p e o p l e  (see, f o r  example,  I n s t i t u t  U n i v e r s i t a i r e  d l E t u d e s  
Europgennes,  1969-70; Hgraud, 1973; Lasu&n, 1 9 7 4 ) .  
The t h i r d  o p t i o n  i s  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  e x p r e s s  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  
t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s h i p  and t o  anyone who c a r e s  t o  l i s t e n ,  
i n  t h e  hope t h a t  s e p a r a t i o n  c a n  be  a v e r t e d  by a p r o c e s s  i n  
which t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s h i p  once  a g a i n  engages  i n  a s e a r c h  
f o r  t h e  c a u s e s  and p o s s i b l e  c u r e s  o f  r e g i o n a l  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s .  
Hirschman 's  compara t ive  a n a l y s i s  of  t h e  " v o i c e "  and " e x i t "  
o p t i o n s  h a s  r e l e v a n c e  h e r e ,  even though h e  does  n o t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  ana logous  " i n t e r e s t  a r t i c u l a t i o n "  and " s e p a r a t i o n "  
c h o i c e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  c a s e s  opposing r e g i o n s  t o  n a t i o n s .  Hirsch-  
man (1970, p. 8 3 )  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  e x i t  o p t i o n  makes r e c o u r s e  t o  v o i c e  less l i k e l y ,  t h e  e f f e c -  
t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  v o i c e  mechanism i s  s t r e n g t h e n e d  by t h e  p o s s i -  
b i l i t y  f o r  e x i t .  Thus, i f  v o i c e  i s  t o  b e  e f f e c t i v e  t h e r e  shou ld  
be  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e x i t ,  b u t  e x i t  shou ld  n o t  b e  t o o  e a s y  o r  
t o o  a t t r a c t i v e  as soon as d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y  sets 
i n .  When e x i t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  and l o y a l t y  is weak, d e t e r i o r a t i o n  
would make f o r  r a p i d  d e s e r t i o n  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l l y  most i n f l u e n -  
t i a l  u s e r s  o f  v o i c e ,  t h e r e b y  c a u s i n g  f u r t h e r  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  
u n i t y  i n  n a t i o n s  t h a t  are s o  c o n s t i t u t e d  as t o  r e s ~ o n d  more t o  
v o i c e  t h a n  t o  e x i t .  
F i g u r e  1 i l l u s t r a t e s  l o y a l i s t  b e h a v i o r  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  
d e c r e a s i n g  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y .  The h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s  measures  d e g r e e  
o f  r e g i o n a l  d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s h i p ;  t h e  
v e r t i c a l  a x i s  measures  t h e  amount o f  v o i c e  fo r thcoming  i n  
r e s p o n s e  t o  d i f f e r e n t  d e g r e e s  o f  d i s a g r e e m e n t .  Because it i s  
f r e e  from f e l t  d i s c o n t e n t ,  unconsc ious  l o y a l i s t  b e h a v i o r  w i l l  
n o t  l e a d  t o  v o i c e .  From t h e  o n s e t  o f  ~ o i n t  UL t h i s  b e h a v i o r  
i s  l o y a l i s t  o n l y  from t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  a n  o u t s i d e  o b s e r v e r  
who feels  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  v o i c e  o r  e x i t  may be j u s t i f i e d  even 
though t h e  r e g i o n a l  l e a d e r s h i p  i s  unaware t h a t  a p r o c e s s  o f  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  is  t a k i n g  p l a c e .  A s  disagreement  between r e g i o n  
and n a t i o n  widens ,  t h e  r e g i o n a l  l e a d e r s h i p  a t t e m p t s  t o  c o r r e c t  
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FIGURE 1 .  LOYALIST BEHAVIOUR WITH INCREASING DISAGREEMENT 
BETWEEN REGION AND NATION. 
and reverse the process by increased use of voice. In the 
absence of loyalty exit would take ÿ lace at X, but if loyalty 
acts as a brake on exit the use of voice intensifies, i.e. 
there is a kink in the voice function at X. As disagreement 
widens further the regional leadership will threaten exit if 
such action could be &xpected to enhance the effectiveness'of 
voice. Thus, at this point (TX) there is a discontinuous 
increase in the use of voice. If disagreement continues to 
increase, loyalty reaches its breaking point and exit occurs 
at XL, the point of exit with loyalty. In situations where 
loyalty is not accompanied by the possibility of exit (as in 
a totalitarian state) the strength of the reqion's loyalty can 
be measured by the distance from X to TX. Under the more 
inclusive concept of loyalty the strength of the region's 
loyalty can be regarded as the distance from X to XL. However, 
the total volume of effective voice forthcoming with widening 
disagreement may be more closely related to the distance between 
TX and XL, that part of the process where the region is likely 
to use the threat of exit in order to change the policies of 
the nation. 
WHO EXPLOITS? WHO SUBSIDIZES? 
It is commonly held that widening disagreement between 
regions and nations is attributable in large part to the eco- 
nomic exploitation of the former by the latter. For example, 
Schumacher (1973, p. 6 6 j  maintains that "the normal case is.. . 
that the poor provinces wish to separate from the rich, and 
that the rich want to hold on because they know that exploita- 
tion of the poor within one's own frontiers is infinitely 
easier than exploitation of the poor beyond them." It is true 
of course that many regions with strong separatist movements 
are lagging economically in relation to the nations of which 
they are a part. Scotland has long had a rate of unemployment 
well above that for the United Kingdom; in 1972 the respective 
rates were 6.5 percent and 3.9 percent (Cameron, 1974, p. 72). 
Because of relative lack of economic opportunity at home 
Scotland lost 325,000 persons, or 95 percent of its natur'al 
increase, through outmigration during the 1961-71 decade 
(Sundquist, 1975, p. 67). In France, Brittany ranks near the 
bottom among the nation's twenty-one planning regions in terms 
of nearly all indicators of economic and social well-being 
(INSEE, 1975). The situation in Corsica is even worse but 
relevant data are not readily available because they are merged 
with data for Provence and the Riviera. In Canada, per capita 
personal income in Qugbec was 90 percent of the national aver- 
age in 1961; by 1971 the corresponding value was only 89 per- 
cent (Stager, 1973, p. 465). 
Nevertheless, care must be taken not to identify economic 
lag with exploitation by richer regions because frequently the 
latter attempt to subsidize the former in a variety of ways. 
For example, in Canada the federal government has undertaken 
to equalize to the national average all revenues raised by the 
provincial governments. ~qualization payments are made uncon- 
ditionally and thus may be used by the relevant provinces as 
they see fit. Under this scheme Ontario, Alberta and British 
Columbia receive nothing. On the other hand, equalization 
payments, together with certain grants, account for about half 
the provincial revenues of the two poorest provinces, Newfound- 
land and Prince Edward Island (Brewis,, 1974). 
Capital subsidies are probably the most widely used device 
to aid economically lagging regions. The objective is not only 
to encourage capital to move to target areas but also to induce 
local investors to invest their capital locally rather than in 
more advanced regions where rates of return are higher. The 
arguments in favor of capital subsidies often are akin to the 
"infant industry" arguments for national protectionist ~olicies. 
The mechanisms by which capital is subsidized vary considerably, 
but they usually involve a package of tax and credit advantages, 
direct grants and technical assistance. Eligibility for subsi- 
dies depends on such considerations as rate of unemployment, 
low per capita income, heavy outmigration, or lack of resources 
and infrastructure. The amount of funds available often varies 
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  zo,ne where a p r o j e c t  i s  l o c a t e d ,  i . e .  t h e  
worse t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  an area t h e  g , r e a t e r  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  
subs idy .  
S u b s i d i e s  t o  l a g g i n g  r e g i o n s  may a l s o  t a k e - i n d i r e c t  forms.  
For example, a  government may u s e  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  l o c a -  
t i o n  o f  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  t o  c r e a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  f a v o r a b l e  t o  t h e  
l o c a t i o n  of  p r i v a t e  inves tment ,  o r  it may d e l i b e r a t e l y  decen- 
t r a l i z e  some a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  i n s t a n c e s  w h e r e .  
t h e  government owns o r  p a r t l y  owns f i r m s  engaged i n  d i r e c t l y  
p r o d u c t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  d i r e c t  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e s  may be  used  
t o  l o c a t e  p l a n t s  i n  t a r g e t  a r e a s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  p o s i t i v e  
i n c e n t i v e s ,  a  government may a l s o  impose n e g a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
on l o c a t i o n s  i n  h i g h l y  developed a r e a s ,  as i s  t h e  c a s e  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  P a r i s .  F i n a l l y ,  s e c t o r a l  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  were n o t  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n t e n d e d  t o  be  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  may have impor- 
t a n t  d i f f e r e n t i a l  r e g i o n a l  consequences.  Thus, i n  France  
d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s u b s i d i e s  have s e r v e d  t o  keep 
more p e o p l e  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s  t h a n  would have been t h e  c a s e  i f  
o n l y  marke t  f o r c e s  w e r e  o p e r a t i v e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  s u b s i d i e s  t o  
t h e  s h i p b u i l d i n g  s e c t o r  i n  t h e  Uni ted  Kingdom have s e r v e d  t o  
p r o p  up employment i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c e n t e r s  o f  w e s t e r n  S c o t l a n d .  
Of c o u r s e ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c e r t a i n  s u b s i d i e s  a r e  accorded 
l a g g i n g  r e g i o n s  d o e s  n o t  mean t h a t  t h e s e  r e g i o n s  a r e  n e c e s s a r i l y  
s u b s i d i z e d  on b a l a n c e  when a l l  f a c t o r s  are  t a k e n  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a -  
t i o n .  I n  t h e  case o f  Canada, a n  e l a b o r a t e  s t u d y  w a s  made t o  
d e t e r m i n e  whe the r  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o v i n c i a l  governments were n e t  
1 g a i n e r s  o r  l o s e r s  when accoun t  was t a k e n  o f  a l l  sums r e c e i v e d  
by Ottawa and o f  a l l  payments made o u t  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  t r e a s u r y .  
B r e w i s  (1974,  p. 3 1 3 )  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  f o r  a  number o f  c o n c e p t u a l  
and p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n s  it proved i m p o s s i b l e  t o  r e a c h  any c l e a r  
answer. Although French r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  e f f o r t s  have a t t r ac t -  
e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n ,  doub t  h a s  been cast  on t h e i r  e f f i -  
c a c y  i n  a c h i e v i n g  t h e i r  s t a t e d  o b j e c t i v e  o f  i n d u c i n g  development 
i n  economica l ly - l agg ing  r e g i o n s .  Prud'homme'(1974) f i n d s  t h a t  
on t h e  whole t h e  s p a t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  i n v e s t m e n t s  h a s  
n o t  f o l l o w e d  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  p r e s c r i p t i o n s .  Two o f  t h e  most 
favored  r e g i o n s  have been t h e  P a r i s  r e g i o n  and Upper Normandy, 
which, a s  t h e  r i c h e s t  r e g i o n s ,  a r e  n o t  supposed t o  r e c e i v e  
s p e c i a l  h e l p ;  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  g o a l  of  f a v o r i n g  t h e  
wes te rn  r e g i o n s  h a s  n o t  been r e s p e c t e d .  A s  f o r  s u b s i d i e s  t o  
p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l ,  t h e i r  impact  on l o c a t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  does  n o t  
s e e m  t o  have been v e r y  g r e a t .  Taken a s  a  whole t h e  l e s s o n s  
from French e x p e r i e n c e  may r e l a t e  more t o  m i s t a k e s  t h a n  t o  
achievements .  S i m i l a r  c r i t i c i s m s  have been l e v e l l e d  a g a i n s t  
r e g i o n a l  development programs i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  (U.S. Depar t -  
ment o f  Commerce, 1974) .  
The c a s e  o f  I t a l y  i l l u s t r a t e s  w e l l  t h e  complex i ty  o f  
r e g i o n a l  d i s p a r i t y  and i n t e r r e g i o n a l  s u b s i d y  i s s u e s .  Some 
s c h o l a r s  stress t h a t  t h e  union o f  I t a l y  o v e r  a  c e n t u r y  aqo h a s  
n o t  b e n e f i t e d  and h a s  pe rhaps  even harmed t h e  South  ( V i t o ,  
1969) .  The i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  South was such t h a t  it 
cou ld  n o t  compete w i t h  t h e  economies o f  s c a l e  and e x t e r n a l  
economies o f  t h e  North. Once t h e  South  l o s t  t a r i f f  p r o t e c t i o n ,  
and w i t h  no p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  d e v a l u a t i o n ,  improved t r a n s p o r t a -  
t i o n  and communications f a c i l i t i e s  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  d r a i n  o f  
r e s o u r c e s  from t h e  South.  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  North h a s  
provided f i s c a l  s u b s i d i e s  t o  t h e  South ,  e s p e c i a l l y  th rough  
t h e  v e h i c l e  of t h e  Cassa p e r  il Mezzogiorno. I n  t h i s  pe r spec -  
t i v e  t h e  h e a l t h  o f  t h e  North h a s  been impor tan t  t o  t h e  South.  
One may a r g u e  t h a t  what t h e  South needs  most a r e  more r u t h l e s s  
measures  t o  i n c r e a s e  e f f i c i e n c y  r a t h e r  t h a n  s u b s i d i e s  t h a t  t e n d  
t o  p rop  up an  a i l i n g  economic s t r u c t u r e .  I n  any e v e n t ,  i n  t h e  
South  t h e r e  i s  no e f f e c t i v e  movement a d v o c a t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  
s e p a r a t i o n  from t h e  Nor th ,  though demands f o r  i n c r e a s e d  s u b s i -  
d i e s  a r e  by no means l a c k i n g .  
The Uni ted  Kingdom p r o v i d e s  one  i n s t a n c e  where s u b s i d i e s  
t o  l a g g i n g  r e g i o n s  appear  t o  have been r e l a t i v e l y  e f f e c t i v e  
and r e l a t i v e l y  e f f i c i e n t  from a  n a t i o n a l  s t a n d p o i n t .  Brown 
(1972, pp. 292-318),  f o r  example, e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  
50,000 j o b s  p e r  y e a r  w e r e  b e i n g  c r e a t e d  i n  development a r e a s  
i n  t h e  l a t e  1960s a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  
e f f e c t s  o f  r e g i o n a l  programs. On t h e  b a s i s  o f  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  
s h i f t - s h a r e  a n a l y s i s  h e  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  a p p r o x i ~ n a t e l y  70,000 
j o b s  p e r  y e a r  w e r e  c r e a t e d  i n  development  a r e a s  between 1961 
and 1966. Moore and Rhodes ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  u s i n g  a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  
s h i f t - s h a r e  t e c h n i q u e ,  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  a  t o t a l  o f  220,000 j o b s  
w e r e  added i n  t h e s e  a r e a s  between '1963, b~hen r e g i o n a l  programs 
w e r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  implemented,  and '1 971 . , N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  
e v i d e n c e  r e g a r d i n g  some o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  magn i tudes  
i s  mixed. Thus ,  as Cameron (1974, p .  96)  p o i n t s  o u t ,  
w h i l e  t h e  c r e d i t  s i d e  o f  r e g i o n a l  pol. icy i s  f a i r l y  
clear--unemployed and u n d e r e m ~ l o y e d  r e s o u r c e s  have  
been  p u t  t o  work, t h e  p a c e  o f  wage i n f l a t i o n  prob-  
a b l y  h a s  been  r e d u c e d ,  and sorne, o f  t i l e  u n d e s i r a b l e  
economic e f f e c t s  o f  o u t m i g r a t i o n  have  been avoided--  
t h e  d e b i t  s i d e  i s  n o t  s o  c l e a r - c u t .  Al though t h e  
e v i d e n c e  s u g g e s t s  t h a - t  t h e  de'velopment c o n t r o l  
s y s t e m  h a s  n o t  caused  a  l a r g e  volume o f  growth t o  
b e  l o s t  t o  t h e  U n i t z d  Kingdom, it i s  n o t  c o n c l u s i v e  
enough t o  p e r m i t  any c o n v i n c i n g  s t a t e m e n t  on  t h e  
d e g r e e  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  c o s t  p e n a l t i e s  s u f f e r e d  by 
companies  which have  been  " i n v i t e d "  t o  d e v e l o p  i n  
t h e  problem a r e a s .  I n d e e d ,  u n t i l  a d d i t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h  
h a s  been  undertalcen,  t h e  economic j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
( o r  t h e  c a s e  a g a i n s t )  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  w i l l  remain 
t a n t a l i z i n g l y  i n  a s t a t e  o f  " n o t  p r o v e n . "  
T h i s  v e r d i c t  a p p l i e s  as w e l l  t o  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  t h a t  have  
implemented r e g i o n a l  p o l i c i e s .  But i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  d i s a g r e e -  
ments  be tween r e g i o n s  and  n a t i o n s  t h e  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  i s  more 
l i k e l y  t o  be r e g i o n a l  e q u i t y  t h a n  n a t i o n a l  e f f i c i e n c y .  I s a r d  
(1975,  pp. 396-405) h a s  p roposed  a  m u l t i r e g i o n a l  l i n e a r  program- 
ming framework f o r  a n a l y z i n g  t h e  GNP f o r e g o n e  when c o n s t r a i n t s  
a r e  i n t r o d u c e d  t o  na r row p e r  c a p i , t a  r e g i o n a l  income d i f f e r e n c e s .  
However, e v e n  i f  s u i t a b l e  d a t a  w e r e  a v a i l a b l e  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  
would n o t  i n  i t s e l f  r e s o l v e  i n t e r r e g i o n a l  c o n f l i c t s .  By p o s i n g  
t h e  problem i n  a  more e x p l i c i t  form it might  even  e x a c e r b a t e  
them. 
I n  any  e v e n t ,  g i v e i ~  t h e  l i m i t e d  e v i d e n c e  a v a i l a b l e ,  t h o s e  
who m a i n t a i n  t h a t  l a g g i n g  r e g i o n s  ( o r  e t  l e a s t  t h o s e  i n  Western 
Europe  a n d  Nor th  America)  are e x p l o i t e d  s t i l l  b e a r  t h e  burden  
o f  p r o o f - - e s p e c i a l l y  i n  v iew o f  . the l a r g e  nuntber o f  r e l a t i v e l y  
poor  r e g i o n s  t h a t  d o  n o t  have  s i g n i f i c a n t  s e p a r a t i s t  movements. 
Some s e p a r a t i s t  movements a r e  i n  f a c t  i n s p i r e d  by t h e  
o p p o s i t e  concern ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  d i sagreement  
between r e g i o n  and n a t i o n  i s  occas ioned  a t  l e a s t  i n  p a r t  by 
t h e  n o t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of  t h e  w e a l t h i e r  r e g i o n s  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  
be ing  e x p l o i t e d  by t h e  poore r  ones .  T h i s  c l e a r l y  i s  t h e  s i t u a -  
t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  Span i sh  S t a t e  and t h e  Basque and 
C a t a l o n i a n  r e g i o n s  (whose e t h n i c  and c u l t u r a l  communities s p i l l  
o v e r  i n t o  France  a t  t h e  wes te rn  and e a s t e r n  ends o f  t h e  P y r e n e e s ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .  Vizcaya ,  i n  t h e  s t r o n g l y  s e p a r a t i s t  Basque 
r e g i o n ,  has  t h e  h i g h e s t  l e v e l  o f  p e r  c a p i t a  income o f  a l l  
S p a i n ' s  f i f t y  p r o v i n c e s .  The f o u r  Basque p r o v i n c e s  a r e  among 
t h e  e i g h t  h i g h e s t - r a n k i n g  p r o v i n c e s  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ;  s i m i l a r l y  
t h e  f o u r  C a t a l o n i a n  p r o v i n c e s  a r e  among t h e  twe lve  h i g h e s t -  
r a n k i n g  p r o v i n c e s  (Richardson,  1971, p. 4 1 ) .  I n  s t u d i e s  o f  
European e t h n o p o l i t i c s  t h e  Basque and C a t a l o n i a n  r e g i o n s  a r e  
r e g a r d e d  a s  prime i n s t a n c e s  o f  economic a l i e n a t i o n  a r i s i n g  
from n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  a r e  p e r c e i v e d  t o  be d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  
r e l a t i v e l y  p r o s p e r o u s  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t i e s .  Hgraud (1973, p.  26), 
f o r  example, a r g u e s  t h a t  " i f  t h e  m i n o r i t y  i s  more f a v o r e d  by 
n a t u r e ,  o r  more g i f t e d ,  it sees i t s  w e a l t h  d i s a p p e a r  t h r o u g h  
f i s c a l  e x a c t i o n s  i n t o  t h e  c o f f e r s  o f  t h e  S t a t e  ( t h e  Basaue 
r e g i o n  and C a t a l o n i a  i n  t h e  Spanish  S t a t e ) . "  
I n  S c o t l a n d  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement was f a i r l y  l i m i t e d  
i n  scope  s o  long  a s  a  c a s e  cou ld  be made t h a t  S c o t l a n d  was 
be ing  s u b s i d i z e d  by England. However, t h e  d i s c o v e r y  o f  Nor th  
Sea o i l  h a s  g i v e n  a c c e l e r a t e d  impetus  t o  t h e  s e p a r a t i s t  c a u s e .  
Whereas London sees o i l  a s  a  p r i n c i p a l  means f o r  overcoming 
c h r o n i c  economic i l l s - - a s  r e f l e c t e d ,  f o r  example, i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  
of  payments--the S c o t t i s h  n a t i o n a l i s t s  s e e  o i l  a s  an o p p o r t u n i t y  
f o r  S c o t l a n d  t o  "go it a l o n e "  q u i t e  n i c e l y .  Whether t h e  devolu-  
t i o n  o f  l i m i t e d  powers t o  S c o t l a n d  w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  overcome 
growing s e n t i m e n t  t h a t  S c o t l a n d  w i l l  be " e x p l o i t e d "  by t h e  
rest of  t h e  Uni ted  Kingdom remains  t o  be s e e n .  
THE ISSUE OF REGIONAL IDENTITY 
Whether o r  n o t  a  r e g i o n  i s  " s u b s i d i z e d "  o r  " e x p l o i t e d N  
economica l ly  it may wish  t o  be i t s  own master f o r  non-economic 
r e a s o n s .  I n  f a c t  r e g i o n s  w i t h  s t r o n g  s e p a r a t i s t  movements 
t y p i c a l l y  have a d i s t i n c t i v e  c u l t u r a l  i d e n t i t y  t h a t  t h e y  wish  
t o  p r e s e r v e .  Thus, t h e  C a t a l a n s  " a r e  n o t  and do n o t  wish  t o  
become Span i sh  o r  French b u t  w i l l  remain C a t a l a n s  ( S o b i e l a -  
C a a n i t z ,  1973, p. 6 3 ) ; "  t h e  Basques "ask  o n l y  one  t h i n g :  t o  
remain  themse lves  ( I t h u r r i a ,  1973, p. 8 7 ) ; "  and "Qugbec h a s  an  
a s s u r a n c e  of i d e n t i t y , "  which i s  " t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h a t  o n e  major  
f a c t o r  o f  n a t i o n a l  d u r a b i l i t y  l a c k i n g  i n  t h e  rest o f  Canada: 
a  d i f f e r e n t  l anguage  and t h e  c u l t u r a l  f a b r i c  t h a t  g o e s  w i t h  
it (Lgvesque, 1976, p. 7431." The ~ u 6 b e c  s e p a r a t i s t  movement 
i l l u s t r a t e s  w e l l  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  economic and non-economic 
m o t i v e s  a r e  bound up t o g e t h e r  i n  t h e  more g e n e r a l  i s s u e  o f  
c o n t r o l .  R e d  Levesque (1976, p. 739) , t h e  movement's l e a d e r  
and t h e  c u r r e n t  head o f  Quebec ' s p r o v i n c i a l  government,  p o i n t s  
o u t  t h a t  t h e  a r e a  o f  economics i s  " t h e  v e r y  f i r s t  where r i s i n g  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  w e r e  bound t o  s t r i k e  a g a i n s t  t h e  w a l l  o f  an  
e n t r e n c h e d  c o l o n i a l  s e t u p ,  w i t h  i t s  now i n t o l e r a b l e  second- 
class s t a t u s  f o r  t h e  French m a j o r i t y ,  and t h e  s t i f l i n g  remote 
c o n t r o l  o f  n e a r l y  a l l  major  d e c i s i o n s  e i t h e r  i n  Ottawa o r  i n  
a l i e n  corpora t@,? f f i ces . "  L6vesque (1976, p .  737) r e a d i l y  
a d m i t s  t h a t  "Undoubtedly French Qu&bec was (as  it remains  t o  
t h i s  day)  t h e  leas t  i l l - t r e a t e d  o f  a l l  c o l o n i e s  i n  t h e  world,11 
b u t  t h i s ,  i n  h i s  (1976,  p. 741) view i s  no s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  
a i m  o f  " f u l l  e q u a l i t y  by t h e  o n l y  means t h r o u g h  which a smaller 
n a t i o n  can  r e a s o n a b l y  e x p e c t  t o  a c h i e v e  it w i t h  a  l a r g e r  one:  
se l f -government . "  I n  terms of F i g u r e  1 ,  i n c r e a s i n g  d i s a g r e e -  
ment h a s  l e d  ~ u g b e c  t o  t h e  v e r y  t h r e s h o l d  of  p o i n t  XL. 
ARE SMALL-AREA ECONOMIES VIABLE? 
Once a region does succeed in establishing itself as a 
separate nation its economic future will depend on the host of 
factors that determine the level of economic well-being in any 
nation, e.g. natural resource endowment, infrastructure facili- 
ties, quality of human resources and entrepreneurial talent, 
and the terms of trade for the nation's products. It also may 
be possible for the newly-created nation to participate in a 
customs union with other countries. In any event, the fact 
that the region-qua-nation's internal market area will be less 
than that of the former national area need not be a critical 
hindrance to economic development. It is sometimes held that 
Germany's prosperity was made possible by Bismark's unification 
of many separate states, but the German-speaking Swiss and 
Austrians who did not join the Reich did just as well economi- 
cally. Indeed, most of the world's wealthiest nations--on a 
per capita basis--are small countries whereas a high proportion 
of the largest countries are relatively poor. 
Johnson (1970, pp. 21-27) has shown how a small country 
like Denmark could survive and prosper even though a little 
over a century ago the consensus was that her days as a nation 
were numbered. After the loss of Norway, southern Swed.en and 
the southern provinces of Jutland, Denmark was an impoverished 
country with poor soil, no minerals or waterpower and few 
forests. The transition to an efficient and democratic market 
economy was set in motion more by education than politics, 
despite significant political reforms. Land reform and the 
cooperative movement also contributed -to rationalizing the 
economy but the latter must be viewed as a response to latent 
market pulls. The rapid growth of Danish cities and towns and 
the even more--rapid growth of industrial cities in the United 
Kingdom, Belgium and Germany in the late nineteenth century 
increased the demand for food in urban markets. Because cheap 
grain could be imported from North America, city dwellers could 
devote a relatively larger proportion of their household bud- 
gets to meat and dairy products. Danish farmers adapted to 
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  and g r a d u a l l y  even  widened t h e  demand f o r  t h e i r  
b u t t e r ,  bacon and  e g g s  by i n s u r i n g  t h a t  a l l  o f  t h e i r  b randed  
p r o d u c t s  had c o n s i s t e n t  and  d e p e n d a b l e  q u a l i t y .  S i m i l a r l y ,  
human s k i l l s  and  o r g a n i z a t i o n  have  been  s u c c e s s f u l l y  a p p l i e d  
by t h e  Danes i n  t h e  d e s i g n  and m a r k e t i n g  o f  h i g h  q u a l i t y  f u r n i -  
t u r e ,  p o r c e l a i n  and  s p e c i a l i z e d  e n g i n e e r i n g  p r o d u c t s .  
I t  s h o u l d  b e  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  ach ievemen t  o f  t h e  Danes 
w a s  n o t  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  mechan ica l  p r o c e s s  b u t  r a t h e r  a r e f l e c -  
t i o n  o f  an  e v o l v i n g  soc io-economic  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  h a s  g i v e n  
e x p r e s s i o n  t o  a whole c u l t u r e  and  way o f  l i f e .  'Much t h e  s a m e  
c o u l d  b e  s a i d  o f  o t h e r  s m a l l  n a t i o n s  t h a t  have  a c h i e v e d  h i g h  
l e v e l s  o f  economic w e l l - b e i n g ,  e . g .  I s r ae l ,  The N e t h e r l a n d s ,  
and t h e  o t h e r  S c a n d i n a v i a n  c o u n t r i e s .  S w i t z e r l a n d  i s  a  some- 
wha-t s p e c i a l  case b e c a u s e  o f  i-ts f o u r  l i n g u i s t i c - c u l t u r a l  
communi t ies .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i s  t h e  same b e c a u s e  
t h e s e  g r o u p s  are l a r g e l y  s e p a r a t e d  i n t o  d i f f e r e n t  c a n t o n s ,  
e a c h  o f  which  h a s  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  l o c a l  autonomy. Belgium 
i s  a n o t h e r  s p e c i a l  case b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  
i n t o  o f t e n  a n t a g o n i s t i c  F l e m i s h  and Walloon s e c t i o n s .  However, 
much o f  t h e  r e c e n t  g rowth  i n  Belgium c a n n o t  be d i v o r c e d  from 
t h e  economic development  e f f o r t s  t h a t  have  been bound u p  w i t h  
t h e  movement t o  g a i n  g r e a t e r  autonomy f o r  F l a n d e r s .  A l s o ,  i f  
Belgium w e r e  a  par t  o f  France- -as  migh t  w e l l  have  been  t h e  
c a s e - - B r u s s e l s  t o d a y  would l i k e l y  b e  a  modest  p r o v i n c i a l  c i t y  
s u c h  a s  Bordeaux,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  c i t y  o f  NATO 
and t h e  Common Marke t .  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
One o f  t h e  ma jo r  c o n c l u s i o n s  t o  emerge f rom a n  I n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l  Economic A s s o c i a t i o n  c o n f e r e n c e  on r e g i o n a l  p rob lems  
was t h a t  " I f ,  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  o r  s o c i a l  r e a s o n s ,  t h e r e  i s  a s t r o n g  
p r e f e r e n c e  o f  l o c a l  communi t i e s  t o  r e t a i n  t h e i r  i d e n t i t y  and  
a c h i e v e  deve lopmen t  w i t h i n  t h e i r  own r e g i o n s ,  t h e r e  c a n  b e  no  
economic o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h i s ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  it i s  r e c o g n i s e d  
t h a t  t h e  consequence  may b e  t h e  e a r n i n g  o f  lower e f f i c i e n c y -  
wages t h a n  c o u l d  p o s s i b , - y  b e  e a r n e d  i n  an a l t e r n a t i v e  more 
favourable location (Robinson, 1969, p. 19)." In the present 
paper it has been argued that this fairly typical view of 
regional separatism is misleading because it is incomplete. 
The implication is that regions that wish to go their own way 
should expect to experience economic disadvantaqes, but viewed 
purely in economic terms many regions with strong separatist 
movements are in a relatively strong position in their national 
context. Moreover, even where this does not appear to be the 
case, socio-cultural forces often can have a profound influence 
on mobilizing resources for development. 
If visionary motives have inspired wasteful grandiose 
schemes, it remains true that many undertakings that have pro- 
pelled nations forward have actually worked even though they 
appeared to represent show-piece psychology. In their drive 
to realize their own identity, separatist regions may also tap 
that "potential for sparking unsuspected energies (Rodwin, 1970, 
p. 31)" that has made successful urban and regional strategies 
work. Separatist regions can create their own viable economic 
areas--if indeed they do not already exist--just as many small 
nations have done. 
As Braudel (1973, p. 770) has demonstrated, "a civilization 
exists fundamentally in a geographic area which has been struc- 
tured by men and history. That is why there are cultural fron- 
tiers and cultural zones of amazing permanence: all the cross- 
fertilization in the world will not alter them." Regional 
separatism--when rooted in a historical sense of regional iden- 
tity--is a phenomenon that will not simply disappear in the 
process of national economic development. It is not our inten- 
tion to romanticize regional movements or to claim that the 
motives of separatist leaders are always noble and selfless. 
We have simply attempted to clarify the economic issues involved 
in separatism, taking account of the fact that they often cannot 
be dissociated from non-economic considerations. ?TI terms of 
those Western regions where strong separatist sentiment exists, 
the evidence suggests that exit by no means necessarily implies 
negative economic consequences and that given responsible lead- 
ership it is not unreasonable to expect an increase in regional 
economic well-being. 
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